We study a particular restitution problem where there is an indivisible good (land or property) over which two agents have rights: the dispossessed agent and the owner. A third party, possibly the government, seeks to resolve the situation by assigning rights to one and compensate the other. There is also a maximum amount of money available for the compensation. We characterize a family of asymmetrically fair rules that are immune to strategic behavior, guarantee minimal welfare levels for the agents, and satisfy the budget constraint.
Introduction
Restitution is a form of delivering justice to people that have been dispossessed of their land or property. We study a particular restitution problem where there is an indivisible good (object) over which two agents have rights: the dispossessed agent and the owner. A third party, possibly the government, seeks to resolve the situation by assigning rights to one and compensate the other. The government faces a budget constraint and the compensation cannot exceed the market value of the object. A rule determines, for each problem, who gets the object and the level of compensation for the other agent. Note that an agent cannot receive the object and a compensation at the same time. Moreover, a negative compensation is not allowed. Our objective is to identify rules that are well-behaved from normative and strategic viewpoints. We assess the desirability of a rule from different perspectives: fairness, incentives, and whether it satisfies the budget constraint.
Our study is inspired by the discussion of reparation for victims of the internal conflict and land restitution in Colombia. The conflict between the government, the Revolutionary Armed Forces of Colombia (FARC), and paramilitaries displaced many people from their lands in the last decades. It is estimated that there are between 3.6 and 5.2 million displaced people in Colombia. In June 2011, the Colombian government introduced a bill on land restitution stipulating that the dispossessed agent gets the land and the owner receives exactly the market value of the land as a compensation. However, only approximately 10% of the displaced people are willing to return to their original residency (Ibáñez, 2009) .
Colombia is not the only country with restitution problems. After the reunification of Germany in 1990, there were 1.2 million (separate) claims for the restitution of land or property expropriated by either the Third Reich or the government of former East Germany (Blacksell and Born, 2002) . When a claim for restitution was endorsed, the applicant had to decide whether he wanted restitution or compensation (Southern, 1993) . Many countries in Central and Eastern Europe also adopted policies for the restitution of land or property that had been confiscated during the Communist era. In Bulgaria, Estonia, and Latvia, the restitution consisted of the delivery of the actual property. Hungary instituted vouchers, which were issued in lieu of cash payments, that could be used to buy shares in privatized companies, to pay for state-owned housing or to buy land at state land auctions. In Lithuania, the restitution law specified the right to receive land or compensation (Grover and Bórquez, 2004) . Another example is South Africa, where after the abolition of apartheid, there was a land restitution program in which land was returned or claimants were compensated financially (Barry, 2011) . The confiscated land during the Cuban revolution and the divided island of Cyprus will most likely lead to similar restitution problems in the future.
Overview of Properties
According to the United Nations, reparative measures should be fair, just, proportionate to the gravity of the violation and the resulting damage, and should include restitution and compensation amongst others (van Boven, 2010) . In the literature of fair allocation, a basic requirement is envyfreeness, i.e., no agent should prefer the other agent's consumption to his own (Foley, 1967) . In a restitution problem, the dispossessed agent is perceived as the victim and thus should receive a more favorable treatment. Therefore, we propose an asymmetric version of envy-freeness that only applies to the dispossessed agent, dispossessed envy-freeness, i.e., the dispossessed agent should not prefer the owner's consumption to his own.
Strategic considerations lead to the next axiom. We may not know agent's valuation of the object. If we ask the agent for his valuation, he may behave strategically. Hence, we require strategy-proofness, i.e., no agent benefits from misrepresenting his valuation. We focus also on possible joint manipulations by the dispossessed agent and the owner, and study pair strategyproofness, i.e., no joint misrepresentation of valuations should make both agents at least as well off, and at least one of them better off. We also consider a weaker version of pair strategy-proofness called weak pair strategy-proofness, i.e., no joint misrepresentation of valuations should make both agents better off.
Since the monetary compensation is provided by the government, there is a budget constraint. The government can give at most the market value of the object to the agent who does not receive the object. Finally, we also would like to guarantee minimal welfare levels for the agents. We define two properties because of the asymmetry of agents in the restitution problem. The first property is dispossessed welfare lower bound, i.e., the consumption of the dispossessed agent should be at least as desirable as the object. The second one is owner welfare lower bound, i.e., the consumption of the owner should be at least as desirable as the object or the market value of the object.
Overview of Results
Our main result is a characterization of the family of rules that satisfy dispossessed envy-freeness, strategy-proofness, and two continuity properties (Theorem 1). The rules in the family are parametrized by a "threshold function" τ and a "monetary compensation function" m. We call these rules the τ -m family. The threshold function τ is a function of the valuation of the owner. The dispossessed agent receives the object if and only if his valuation weakly surpasses the threshold. In addition, the threshold function determines the compensation for the dispossessed agent when he does not get the object. The compensation function m is a function of the valuation of the dispossessed agent, and determines the compensation for the owner when he does not get the object.
Next, we consider the budget constraint and identify the subfamily of the τ -m family that also satisfies government budget constraint (Theorem 2). Moreover, we incorporate welfare lower bounds and identify the subfamily of the τ -m family that also satisfies owner welfare lower bound (Theorem 3)-all our rules in the τ -m family satisfy dispossessed welfare lower bound (Remark 2). Finally, we characterize the subfamily of the τ -m family that satisfies both properties, government budget constraint and owner welfare lower bound (Theorem 4).
The Colombian government's rule does not satisfy dispossessed envy-freeness. In the family of the rules that we characterize, there are "simple" rules that are easy to put in practice and satisfy dispossessed envy-freeness and government budget constraint. As an example, consider the rule that gives the land to the dispossessed agent if and only if his valuation is at least the market value of the land. The agent who does not get the land receives the market value as a compensation. This rule belongs to all the families we characterize in Theorems 1, 2, 3, and 4.
Related Literature
The closest model to ours is the allocation of indivisible goods where (both positive and negative) monetary transfers are possible. In this model, strategy-proof rules are characterized (Nisan, 2007, Ch. 9) . Each of these rules specifies a threshold function for each agent that depends only on the other agents' valuations. If an agent's valuation is below the threshold, he does not get any object and receives a monetary transfer that depends only on the other agents' valuations. If his valuation is above the threshold, he receives an object and receives a monetary transfer that depends only on the other agents' valuations and the threshold. This result generalizes the characterization of the rules that are strategy-proof and object efficient, i.e., objects are always allocated to agents with the highest valuations (Holmström, 1979) . 1 In the allocation of indivisible goods together with some amount of money where the goods are always allocated, envy-freeness implies object efficiency (Svensson, 1983) . A rule is budget balanced if the sum of the monetary transfers is equal to the amount of money available. Here, envy-freeness, strategy-proofness, and budget balancedness are not compatible (Alkan et al., 1991; Tadenuma and Thomson, 1995) . However, this incompatibility does not hold in the domain where the monetary transfers cannot exceed some exogenously given upper bound for each good (Sun and Yang, 2003; Andersson and Svensson, 2008a; Svensson, 2009 ). For instance, the "optimal fair rules" are envy-free and strategy-proof (Sun and Yang, 2003) . 2 Moreover, they are characterized by envy-freeness, a regularity condition, and group strategy-proofness, i.e., no group of agents benefits from misrepresenting their valuations (Andersson and Svensson, 2008a; Svensson, 2009) . When there are copies of one indivisible good and the sum of the monetary transfers can be at most the amount of money available, envy-free and strategy-proof rules are characterized (Ohseto, 2006) . 3 In the domain where monetary transfers have to be between a lower bound and an upper bound for each good, envy-freeness and strategy-proofness are incompatible (Andersson and Svensson, 2008b; Andersson et al., 2010) . Andersson et al. (2010) consider a problem in which the monetary transfer for an agent who does not receive an object is fixed. They define a weaker version of envy-freeness that only applies to the agents that do receive a good, constrained envy-freeness, i.e., an agent receiving an object should not envy an agent who does not receive an object. They show that there are rules satisfying constrained envy-freeness but not strategy-proofness. Andersson and Svensson (2008b) consider a problem in which there are copies of one indivisible good and introduce weak envy-freeness. A rule is weakly envy-free if it satisfies three conditions: (i) the rule respects priorities, i.e., given a priority order among the agents, no agent envies some other agent with a lower priority; (ii) it is object efficient; and (iii) no agent envies any agent that receives a positive 1 Holmström (1979) shows that the strategy-proof and object efficient rules are Groves rules (Vickrey, 1961; Clark, 1971; Groves, 1973) . Strategy-proofness and object efficiency imply transfers that need not sum to zero, i.e., an incompatibility with balancedness (Green and Laffont, 1977) .
2 The "optimal fair rules" are not the only rules that are envy-free and strategy-proof. For an example, see Svensson (2009) .
3 Andersson et al. (2012) , on the other hand, do not consider envy-freeness but instead focus on "competitive" and budget-balanced allocation rules satisfying a weaker version of strategy-proofness.
monetary transfer. They characterize weakly envy-free and group strategy-proof rules that satisfy some regularity conditions. In our model, we consider one indivisible good, lower bounds on the monetary transfers (equal to zero), and an upper bound on the monetary transfer for the agent who receives the object (equal to zero). In Proposition 1, we characterize the envy-free and strategy-proof rules. These rules are closely related to the ones characterized by Ohseto (2006) and Svensson (2009) . The main difference is that we do not consider an upper bound on the monetary transfer for the agent who does not receive the object. When this upper bound is introduced (government budget constraint), envy-freeness and strategy-proofness are incompatible.
The τ -m family is a subfamily of the rules characterized by Nisan (2007) . However, the τ -m family is different from the family of weakly envy-free and group strategy-proof rules in Andersson and Svensson (2008b) . First, dispossessed envy-freeness is weaker than weak envy-freeness. In our model, respecting priorities is equivalent to dispossessed envy-freeness only when the dispossessed agent would have a higher priority (but we do not make this assumption). Moreover, dispossessed envy-freeness does not imply object efficiency, unlike weak envy-freeness. Second, strategy-proofness is weaker than group strategy-proofness. Our paper introduces a family of strategy-proof and asymmetrically fair rules that is not necessarily object efficient.
In the models above, including ours, the object is always allocated. Athanasiou (2011) and Sprumont (2013) focus on a model in which an object might remain unallocated. They study rules that are, among other properties, strategy-proof and anonymous, i.e., the rule does not depend on the name of the agents. Strategy-proofness and anonymity imply that whenever the object is allocated, it is assigned to an agent with the highest valuation. Our rules do not satisfy this property. In some problems, the agent with the lowest valuation receives the object.
Finally, there are also two papers about land acquisition with many sellers and one buyer that focus on Bayesian incentive compatibility (Mishra et al., 2008; Kominers and Weyl, 2011) . Kominers and Weyl (2011) propose "concordance mechanisms" that are "approximately individually rational," ensure incentive compatibility, and converge to efficiency as the number of sellers tends to infinite. Mishra et al. (2008) characterize incentive compatible mechanisms that satisfy exactly two of the properties among individual rationality, budget balancedness, and efficiency.
In Section 2, we introduce the model and some properties of rules. In Section 3, we present our results and the independence of axioms. Section 4 concludes. All proofs are relegated to the Appendix.
Model and Properties of Rules
There is an indivisible good, an object γ, and there are two agents: the dispossessed agent d and the owner o. Each agent may consume either the object or a non-negative monetary compensation but not both. The consumption space for each agent is {γ} ∪ R + . Each agent has preferences over the consumption space which have a utility representation u d for the dispossessed agent and u o for the owner. We assume that for each agent, there exists a finite compensation such that he is indifferent between receiving this amount of compensation and getting the object. Let V d and V o be these compensations which we call the valuation of the object for the dispossessed agent and the valuation of the owner, respectively. Then, u d (γ) = V d and u o (γ) = V o , and for any compensation m ∈ R + , u d (m) = u o (m) = m. The compensation is given by a third party, to which we refer to as the government. Let V g > 0 be the market value of the object. 4 Although
) is the primitive of the problem, since V g does not change throughout the paper, we define a restitution problem as a pair (
+ . An allocation z ∈ ({γ} ∪ R + ) 2 is an assignment of the object γ and a compensation m ≥ 0 such that
Note that an agent cannot receive the object and a compensation at the same time. Moreover, a negative compensation is not allowed.
Next, we discuss several desirable properties of rules. Let ϕ be a rule. We are interested in rules that are fair. One of the basic fairness requirements is envy-freeness, i.e., no agent should prefer the other agent's consumption to his own.
Since in a restitution problem the dispossessed agent is perceived as the victim and the "weakest" agent, and thus should receive a more favorable treatment, we propose an asymmetric version of envy-freeness that applies only to the dispossessed agent, dispossessed envy-freeness, i.e., the dispossessed agent should not prefer the owner's consumption to his own. 5
Dispossessed envy-freeness:
Strategic considerations lead to the next axiom. We may not know agents' true valuations of the object. As agents may behave strategically, we require strategy-proofness, i.e., no agent should benefit from misrepresenting his valuation.
We also focus on possible joint manipulations by both agents. We study pair strategy-proofness, i.e., no joint misrepresentation of valuations should make an agent better off without making the other worse off.
4 In many instances, the market value of the object may not be known. In these cases, the market value represents the maximum amount of money that the government is willing to give as a compensation.
5 Dispossessed envy-freeness is weaker than weak envy-freeness introduced in Andersson and Svensson (2008b) .
Weak envy-freeness implies respecting priorities, which in our model would be equivalent to dispossessed envy-freeness when the dispossessed agent were to have a higher priority.
Pair strategy-proofness:
We consider a weaker version of the above property and study weak pair strategy-proofness, i.e., no joint misrepresentation of valuations should make both agents better off.
Weak pair strategy-proofness:
Note that pair strategy-proofness implies weak pair strategy-proofness but not strategy-proofness. 6 Since the compensation is provided by the government, there is a budget constraint. The government can give at most the market value of the object, V g , to the agent who does not receive the object.
We consider rules that guarantee welfare lower bounds for the agents. The asymmetry of the problem leads us to define two conditions. We consider dispossessed welfare lower bound, i.e., the dispossessed agent should be given something at least as desirable as the object. Since the owner possesses the object, to guarantee his participation it is enough to compensate him with the minimum of his valuation and the market value of the object. Hence, we consider owner welfare lower bound, i.e., the owner should either get the object or should receive at least as much as the minimum of his valuation and the market value of the object.
Dispossessed welfare lower bound: For each
Owner welfare lower bound:
We are interested in rules for which small changes in the data of the problem do not cause large changes in the chosen allocation in terms of the welfare of the dispossessed agent or the allocation of the object.
Object continuity:
3 Results
Fairness and Incentive Compatibility
First, we show that there are envy-free and strategy-proof rules. In fact, there is essentially a unique rule.
we show that by envy-freeness and strategy-proofness, the allocation is (
We define a family of rules in which each rule is associated with a tie-breaking function and vice versa each tie-breaking function induces a rule. Formally, for a tie-breaking function θ,
Proposition 1. A rule ϕ satisfies envy-freeness and strategy-proofness if and only if there is a tie-breaking function θ such that ϕ = ϕ θ . 7
In a restitution problem, the dispossessed agent is perceived as the victim and thus should receive a more favorable treatment. Hence, we are interested in dispossessed envy-free and strategy-proof rules, i.e., a wider class of rules than those of Proposition 1. Before we present our main results, it is convenient to introduce the so-called τ -m family. Each rule in this family is parametrized by a "threshold function" τ and a "(monetary) compensation function" m. The threshold function τ is a function of V o . The dispossessed agent d receives the object if and only if V d weakly exceeds the threshold. In addition, the threshold function specifies the compensation for d when he does not get the object. The compensation function m is a function of V d , and specifies the compensation for the owner o when he does not get the object. Note that how much o receives as a compensation only depends on V d .
Formally, a threshold function is a function τ :
• is continuous; for each
; and
Let T be set of all threshold functions. Before defining the compensation function, we introduce some notation. For each
7 Note that ϕ θ is a Groves rule (Vickrey, 1961; Clark, 1971; Groves, 1973; Holmström, 1979) . For the tightness of the characterization, we refer to the Appendix. 
The valuation V d can be of three different types according to the characteristics of the associated τ −1 (V d ).
Note that since τ functions are non-decreasing and satisfy constant threshold, if V d is of type 2 , Figure 1 for examples of τ and τ −1 (V d ).
A compensation function is used to determine a monetary compensation for the owner and hence is defined over
Formally, a compensation function is a function m :
be the set of all compensation functions for a given threshold function τ . Let τ ∈ T and m ∈ M(τ ). We define the rule ϕ τ,m as follows.
We call the family of rules induced by pairs (τ, m) with τ ∈ T and m ∈ M(τ ) the τ -m family. 9 See Figure 2 for examples of rules in this family.
Next, we present our first main result which is a characterization of the τ -m family.
Theorem 1. A rule ϕ satisfies dispossessed envy-freeness, strategy-proofness, continuity, and object continuity if and only if there exist τ ∈ T and m ∈ M(τ ) such that ϕ = ϕ τ,m . 10
Moreover, each rule in the τ -m family is weakly pair strategy-proof.
Proposition 2. Let τ ∈ T and m ∈ M(τ ). Then, ϕ τ,m is weakly pair strategy-proof.
Some rules in the τ -m family are even pair strategy-proof.
Proposition 3. Let τ ∈ T and m ∈ M(τ ). Then, ϕ τ,m is pair strategy-proof if and only if for each V o ∈ R + , τ (V o ) = 0 and there exists a constant c ∈ R + such that for each In (d), V d is of type 3 . In both (c) and (d), the compensation is chosen from the interval between 0 and V d .
Government Budget Constraint
Now, we consider the budget constraint faced by the government, assuming that it can or is willing to spend at most the market value of the object as a compensation.
Remark 1. There is no rule that satisfies envy-freeness, strategy-proofness, and government budget constraint (since there are problems (
This impossibility result is not true in the model where an agent can receive the object and a (positive or negative) monetary transfer that cannot exceed some exogenously given upper bound (Sun and Yang, 2003; Ohseto, 2006; Svensson, 2009 ). In our model, the exogenous upper bound would be V g .
Next, we obtain a subfamily of the τ -m family that satisfies government budget constraint. In this subfamily, each threshold function is bounded above by V g . Moreover, the upper bound Theorem 2. A rule ϕ satisfies dispossessed envy-freeness, strategy-proofness, continuity, object continuity, and government budget constraint if and only if ϕ = ϕ τ,m where τ ∈ T and m ∈ M(τ ) are such that Figure 3 for examples of rules in this subfamily.
Welfare Lower Bounds
Now, we consider properties that guarantee minimum welfare levels for the agents.
Remark 2. It is immediate to see that each rule in the τ -m family satisfies dispossessed welfare lower bound.
The next result is the characterization of the subfamily of the τ -m family that satisfies also owner welfare lower bound. In this subfamily, each threshold function is bounded below by min{V o , V g } and it cannot cross the 45 • line before the value of V g . Moreover, the lower bound Figure 4 : Examples of rules in the τ -m family satisfying owner welfare lower bound.
Note that since for each Theorem 3. A rule ϕ satisfies dispossessed envy-freeness, strategy-proofness, continuity, object continuity, and owner welfare lower bound if and only if ϕ = ϕ τ,m where τ ∈ T and m ∈ M(τ ) are such that
Note that for each Figure 4 for examples of rules in this subfamily.
Our last result is the characterization of the subfamily of the τ -m family that satisfies both government budget constraint and owner welfare lower bound. In this subfamily, each threshold function is bounded above by V g and bounded below by min{V o , V g } and it cannot cross the 45 • line before the value of V g . Moreover, both the upper bound u(V d ) and the lower bound l(V d ) of each compensation function are equal to V g if V d is of type 2 or 3 . Figure 5 : Examples of rules in the τ -m family satisfying government budget constraint and owner welfare lower bound. Note that the τ functions are bounded above by V g , and since for Theorem 4. A rule ϕ satisfies dispossessed envy-freeness, strategy-proofness, continuity, object continuity, government budget constraint, and owner welfare lower bound if and only if ϕ = ϕ τ,m where τ ∈ T and m ∈ M(τ ) are such that
Note that for each Figure 5 for examples of rules in this subfamily. In Table 1 , we summarize our results and compare the threshold functions and the lower and upper bounds for the compensation functions in each family in Theorems 1, 2, 3, and 4. 
Tightness of Characterizations
In this section, we prove the tightness of our characterizations in Theorems 1, 2, 3, and 4. 11 Table 2 summarizes the independence of the properties. 
The rule
It satisfies strategyproofness, continuity, object continuity, owner welfare lower bound, government budget con-straint, dispossessed welfare lower bound, and weak pair strategy-proofness but not dispossessed envy-freeness.
2. The rule ϕ min,Vg is defined as
It satisfies dispossessed envy-freeness, continuity, object continuity, owner welfare lower bound, government budget constraint, dispossessed welfare lower bound, and weak pair strategy-proofness but not strategy-proofness.
3. The rule ϕ • is defined as
+ . It satisfies dispossessed envy-freeness, strategy-proofness, object continuity, owner welfare lower bound, government budget constraint, dispossessed welfare lower bound, and weak pair strategy-proofness but not continuity.
Let τ ∈ T and m ∈ M(τ ). The rule ϕ > is defined as
It satisfies dispossessed envy-freeness, strategy-proofness, continuity, owner welfare lower bound, government budget constraint, dispossessed welfare lower bound, and weak pair strategy-proofness but not object continuity.
5. Let k > V g . The rule ϕ k>Vg is defined as ϕ k>Vg = ϕ τ,m where for each
It satisfies dispossessed envy-freeness, strategy-proofness, continuity, object continuity, owner welfare lower bound, dispossessed welfare lower bound, and weak pair strategy-proofness but not government budget constraint.
6. The rule ϕ τ =m=0 is defined as ϕ τ =m=0 = ϕ τ,m where for each V o ∈ R + , τ (V o ) = 0 and each
It satisfies dispossessed envy-freeness, strategy-proofness, continuity, object continuity, government budget constraint, dispossessed welfare lower bound, and weak pair strategy-proofness but not owner welfare lower bound.
Concluding Remarks
We consider the allocation of an indivisible good when compensation, subject to a budget constraint, is only possible for the agent who does not get the good. Our main result is the characterization of rules that satisfy dispossessed envy-freeness, strategy-proofness, and two continuity properties. We identify the subfamily of rules that also satisfy government budget constraint and another subfamily of rules that also satisfy owner welfare lower bound. Finally, we characterize the subfamily of rules that satisfy both properties, government budget constraint and owner welfare lower bound.
In the context of land restitution in Colombia, which inspired our study, the government's rule does not satisfy dispossessed envy-freeness. However, in the family of the rules that we characterize, there are "simple" rules that are easy to put in practice and satisfy dispossessed envy-freeness and government budget constraint. As an example, consider the rule that gives the land to the dispossessed agent if and only if his valuation is at least the market value of the land. The agent who does not get the land receives the market value as a compensation. This rule belongs to all the families we characterize in Theorems 1, 2, 3, and 4.
Additional fairness properties can be considered in our model. In the fairness literature, a weaker property than envy-freeness, equal treatment of equals, has been studied. This property states that when two agents are "equal," they should receive the same consumption. In our model, equal treatment of equals is impossible because of the restriction on consumption (an agent can only receive either the object or money). As an alternative, we can consider a property that requires that when the dispossessed and the owner have the same valuation of the object and this valuation is smaller than the government constraint, both agents should receive the same in welfare terms. We call this property constrained equal treatment of equals in welfare. There is a unique rule in the subfamily characterized in Theorem 4 that satisfies constrained equal treatment of equals in welfare, where τ is the 45 • -line up to V g and constant afterwards. Moreover, this rule minimizes envy among the rules in the τ -m family that satisfy government budget constraint.
Finally, we could ask how the government should select the τ function. The government may not know the exact valuations of the dispossessed agent and the owner. But if the uncertainty of the government can be modeled as a probability distribution over the valuations, then it could decide to choose a τ function that gives the object to the dispossessed agent more often in expectation, or that minimizes the expected compensation. In case the set of possible valuations is uniformly distributed over a finite rectangle containing the origin, the τ function that coincides with the 45 • -line up to V g gives the object to the dispossessed agent more often in expectation. In case there is a degenerate mass at the valuation of the owner, then again the τ function that coincides with the 45 • -line up to V g minimizes the expected government expenditure.
Possible future research could tackle a generalization of our model where an owner has more than one piece of land or the dispossessed agent has preferences over multiple pieces of land and may receive a piece of land that he did not possess before.
Appendix
Proposition 1. A rule ϕ satisfies envy-freeness and strategy-proofness if and only if there is a tie-breaking function θ such that ϕ = ϕ θ .
Proof. It is easy to check that ϕ θ satisfies envy-freeness and strategy-proofness. We prove that if ϕ is envy-free and strategy-proof, then there is a tie-breaking function θ such that ϕ = ϕ θ . Let
+ . By envy-freeness, if an agent has a strictly higher valuation than the other agent, then the former gets the object (Svensson, 1983) .
Next, we show that the agent who does not get the object receives a compensation equal to the other agent's valuation. Without loss of generality, assume that
Then, by envy-freeness (the owner gets the object at (
Tightness of the characterization in Proposition 1:
+ . It satisfies strategyproofness but not envy-freeness.
Proof. Since the allocation is independent of the reported valuations of the agents, ϕ G is strategy-
) which is a contradiction to envy-freeness.
The rule ϕ ≥ is defined as
It satisfies envy-freeness but not strategy-proofness.
Proof. It is to easy to see that ϕ ≥ is envy-free. If V d ≥ V o , the dispossessed agent gets the object and the owner receives
, the owner gets the object and the dispossessed agent receives
. Then, V o is a profitable manipulation for the owner at (V d , V o ). Hence, ϕ ≥ is not strategy-proof. Theorem 1. A rule ϕ satisfies dispossessed envy-freeness, strategy-proofness, continuity, and object continuity if and only if there exist τ ∈ T and m ∈ M(τ ) such that ϕ = ϕ τ,m .
Proof. (⇒) Let ϕ be dispossessed envy-free, strategy-proof, continuous, and object continuous. We need to show that there exist a threshold function τ ∈ T and a compensation function m ∈ M(τ ) such that ϕ = ϕ τ,m .
Let
(2)
In view of Lemma 1 and given the valuation of the owner V o , we define the infimum of the valuations of the dispossessed agent that give him the object. Formally,
Then, by the definition of τ (V o ) and Lemma 1, we know that if
(Otherwise, the statement holds trivially.)
Step 1: There exists t such that for each
Suppose it is not the case. Then, there are
Then, V d is a profitable manipulation for the dispossessed agent at (V d , V o ) in violation of strategyproofness. Hence, there exists t such that for each
Step 2:
Step 3:
Therefore, Equation (1b) holds. Next, we show that τ ∈ T .
τ is non-decreasing.
. Suppose V o is the valuation of the owner. Then, by strategy-proofness, we have
. Now, suppose V o is the valuation of the owner. Then, by strategy-proofness, we have
τ is continuous.
Let V o ∈ R + . We show that τ is right-continuous and left-continuous at V o .
Step 1:
Hence, τ is right-continuous at V o .
Before proving τ is left-continuous at V o , we show that ϕ satisfies another type of continuity.
Lemma 3. Let ϕ be dispossessed envy-free, strategy-proof, continuous, and object continuous.
Step 2: τ is left-continuous at V o .
12 Note that this continuity property is based on a sequence of valuations of the owner (i.e., not valuations of the dispossessed agent as in object continuity).
Assume that τ is not left-continuous at V o . Let {V n o } ∞ n=1 be such that V n o is non-decreasing and
We have shown that τ ∈ T . We now construct a function m ∈ M(τ ) and show Equation (1a) in three steps.
Step 2: Let m :
Using the previous arguments, we have that
(⇐) We need to show that ϕ τ,m is dispossessed envy-free, strategy-proof, continuous, and object continuous.
ϕ τ,m is dispossessed envy-free.
Therefore, the dispossessed agent never envies the owner. ϕ τ,m is strategy-proof. We show that the rule is strategy-proof for each agent.
Step 1: ϕ τ,m is strategy-proof for the dispossessed agent.
So, there is no profitable manipulation for the dispossessed agent.
. So, there is no profitable manipulation for the dispossessed agent. Therefore, ϕ τ,m is strategy-proof for the dispossessed agent.
Step 2: ϕ τ,m is strategy-proof for the owner.
, the owner does not get the object and receives
The owner changes the allocation if and only if V d < τ (V o ) and in that case it is profitable if and
So, there is no profitable manipulation for the owner.
Since
and τ is continuous and satisfies constant threshold,
Obviously, V d can only be of type 1 or 3 . The owner gets the object at (V d , V o ). The only possible candidate for a profitable manipulation is
If
Therefore, ϕ τ,m is strategy-proof for the owner. Therefore, ϕ τ,m is strategy-proof.
Case 1: There exists N such that for each n ≥ N ,
in which case we have for each
complement one another (with respect to the original sequence
By arguments similar to
) and by arguments similar to Case 2,
complement one another with respect to the original sequence
Therefore, ϕ τ,m is dispossessed envy-free, strategy-proof, continuous, and object continuous.
+ . Assume that the owner receives the object. Then,
The only possible manipulation that might make both of them better off is (
, which means the dispossessed agent is worse off. Hence, there is no profitable joint manipulation that makes both of them better off.
Next, assume that the dispossessed agent receives the object. Then,
. The only possible manipulation that might make both of them better off is (
Hence, there is no profitable joint manipulation that makes both of them better off. Therefore, ϕ τ,m is weakly pair strategy-proof.
Proposition 3. Let τ ∈ T and m ∈ M(τ ). Then, ϕ τ,m is pair strategy-proof if and only if for each V o ∈ R + , τ (V o ) = 0 and there exists a constant c ∈ R + such that for each
Proof. (⇒) Let τ ∈ T , m ∈ M(τ ), and ϕ τ,m be pair strategy-proof.
Step 1: There is a constant k ∈ R + such that for each
Suppose it is not the case. Then, there exist
, in violation of pair strategy-proofness.
Step 2: There is a constant c ∈ R + such that for each
Summarizing Steps 1 and 2,
Step 3: k = 0. Suppose it is not the case. Then,
Hence, there is no profitable joint manipulation. Therefore, ϕ τ =0,m=c is pair strategy-proof.
Theorem 2. A rule ϕ satisfies dispossessed envy-freeness, strategy-proofness, continuity, object continuity, and government budget constraint if and only if ϕ = ϕ τ,m where τ ∈ T and m ∈ M(τ ) are such that
Proof. (⇒) By Theorem 1, we know that there exist a threshold function τ ∈ T and a compensation function m ∈ M(τ ). Since ϕ satisfies government budget constraint, for each (
Therefore, the threshold function τ and the compensation function m satisfy the conditions in the statement of the theorem.
(⇐) Let τ ∈ T and m ∈ M(τ ) satisfy the conditions in the statement of the theorem. We show that ϕ τ,m satisfies government budget constraint. (By Theorem 1, ϕ τ,m satisfies the other properties described in Theorem 2.)
Theorem 3. A rule ϕ satisfies dispossessed envy-freeness, strategy-proofness, continuity, object continuity, and owner welfare lower bound if and only if ϕ = ϕ τ,m where τ ∈ T and m ∈ M(τ ) are such that
Proof. (⇒) By Theorem 1, we know that there exist τ ∈ T and m ∈ M(τ ) such that ϕ = ϕ τ,m .
For
Suppose that there exists 
However, by the choice of
Case 2: V d is of type 3 . Subcase 2.1: 
(⇐) Let τ ∈ T and m ∈ M(τ ) satisfy the conditions in the statement of the theorem. We show that ϕ τ,m satisfies owner welfare lower bound. (By Theorem 1, ϕ τ,m satisfies the other properties described in Theorem 3.) Let (
We now check that m(
Therefore, ϕ τ,m satisfies owner welfare lower bound. V o ) ). Then, V o is a profitable manipulation for the owner at (V d , V o ). Hence, ϕ min,Vg is not strategy-proof.
It is to easy to see that ϕ min,Vg is dispossessed envy-free. For each (V d , V o ) ∈ R 2 + , if V d ≥ V g , the dispossessed agent gets the object and the owner receives min{V o , V g } ≤ V d . If V d < V g , the owner gets the object and the dispossessed agent receives V g > V d . It is easy but cumbersome to show that ϕ min,Vg is continuous and object continuous.
Since the rule always assigns a compensation less than V g , ϕ min,Vg satisfies government budget constraint. 3. Continuity: The rule ϕ • is defined as 
It is easy but cumbersome to show (case by case) that ϕ • is dispossessed envy-free, strategyproof, and object continuous. For each (V d , V o ) ∈ R 2 + and i ∈ {d, o}, if
• satisfies owner welfare lower bound. Since the dispossessed agent gets the object or receives a compensation greater than his valuation, ϕ • satisfies dispossessed welfare lower bound. Finally, ϕ • is weakly pair strategy-proof. The proof is very similar to the one of Proposition 2.
4. Object continuity: Let τ ∈ T and m ∈ M(τ ). The rule ϕ > is defined as
